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The executive acts as a symbol that naturalizes hierarchies of power where white masculinity is ritualized and performed through militarized violence – the presidency is a site of control over social power that enacts violence against disposable bodies is naturalized by ideologies that are allowed to define what is acceptable

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The presidency is a paternalistic office, and has been so ever since George Washington became the ‘‘ Father of Our Country,’’ sometimes accompanied by others among the‘‘ Founding Fathers,¶ ’’¶ now of course referred to merely as ‘‘ the Founders ’’ (Kann,1998). It is probably not a coincidence that so many of our presidents have been military men; or that even in contemporary times, they take pains to be seen¶ exercising the¶ ‘‘¶ manly pursuits¶ ’’¶ of hunting and fishing; presidents who are not doing well politically are often seen as ‘‘ small,’’ they can be feminized, they are understood as failing to fulfill the¶ ‘‘¶ heroic¶ ’’¶ and undoubtedly masculine understanding of the presidency (Duerst-Lahti, 2008, p. 733).These gendered dynamics of the institution are difficult to study because social norms change, it remains clear that there are consistently masculinist norms associated with the office (Orman, 1987). The presidency is an important site where our national expectations of gender are performed and ritualized, but there are few studies that examine this in any detail. Despite the possibilities seemingly opened up in this last election, given the harshness of the various criticisms leveled at Hillary Rodham Clinton and Sarah Palin¶ \* ¶ two women who otherwise have little in common¶ \* ¶ it is not hard to make the argument that the role of women in our political life remains problematic at best. Women traditionally have to demonstrate their¶ ‘‘¶ toughness,¶ ’’¶ and prove that they can be as determined and strong, perhaps as aggressive as their male counterparts (Sykes, 2008, p. 761). Both Clinton and Palin are undoubtedly ¶ ‘‘¶ tough¶ ’’¶ enough; but that toughness created dissonances that neither could over come. We know that political processes and institutions can be gendered in important ways (Carroll & Fox, 2006; Chappell, 2008) just as we know that all presidents have been men, and that this necessarily had an effect on the office. Yet when women and the executive branch get studied, more often than not, it is because of the role of First Lady (Parry-Giles & Blair, 2002; Templin, 1999; Watson, 2000). There have been some steps made in the direction of studying how women exercise executive power in their own right (Martin & Borelli, 2000) however, and more needs to be done in this area. Because of Hillary Rodham Clinton, the treatment of the president as inevitably male may be difficult to maintain. The presidential body does matter, even though it matters in ways that too often go unacknowledged:¶ ‘‘¶ Rendered largely invisible until the late twentieth century, the raced and sexed control of political and social power and institutions by white men has rested upon naturalized hegemonic gender and race ideologies that make disparate and denigrating treatment seem ordinary and acceptable to those with entrenched power advantages¶ ’’¶ (Hawkesworth, 2003). Certainly, it is true that power plays out through people’ s bodies, and there is very little work grounded in the rhetorical presidency that brings bodies to the forefront (for at least one exception to this rule, see Houck & Kiewe, 2003). We do not seem to think of the rhetorical presidency or even of presidential rhetoric as embodying leadership; it is a potentially important and productive site of study. The excess of manliness in the presidency, of course, often extends to sexuality. Presidents are allowed to be assertively if not aggressively heterosexual. Americans seem to dismiss or even applaud presidential sexuality, despite the puritanical streak that became obvious during the Lewinsky scandal (Stuckey & Wabshall, 2000). But that sexuality is assumed to be heterosexual. Many citizens were willing to assert that what Bill Clinton did¶ ‘‘¶ privately ¶ ’’¶ did not affect his presidential duties; but it would be interesting to know if that attitude would have prevailed had the intern in question been male. Charles E. Morris III has contributed important work on queering public address (2007), but as difficult as that project is in general, it may be much more difficult to queer the presidency, and this may well be at least partly attributable to the fact that it is such an aggressively masculine office. There has been some work done in the are a of the area of presidential sexuality (Morris, 2007; Morris, forthcoming; Schwartz,2008), but the consequences of that sexuality for presidential public address remain unclear and underexplored. Because of this dearth of work in the areas of gender, sexuality, and the presidency, it may be one of the richest sites for future work. We need to know more about how presidential power is performed, and why these performances seem to be so clearly connected to military and militarized views of leadership. We need to understand more deeply how the embodiment of leadership in race, class, and gendered ways affects the way we understand the office and ourselves as a nation. The presidency is not just a site of privilege, but the embodiment of specific kinds of privilege, and much more can be done to understand how it functions to maintain and challenge similar structures of power and privilege throughout our national politics.

**Nowhere is this as clearly demonstrated than the rhetoric surrounding the use of “predator drones” whose very name naturalizes the destruction of the other into the political order. Executive violence is coded through an abstract, masculine cycle of protection and predation where the aggression of “brown men” necessitate response in kind.**

**Bayard de Volo, 2012** – Lorraine Professor at University of Colorado Boulder in Women and Gender Studies and Department of Political Science. Unmanned?: Drones and the Revolution in Gender-Military Affairs. May 3, 2012. <http://www.ecpg-barcelona.com/sites/default/files/Ppr-Unmanned-ECPG.pdf>

At the 2010 White House Correspondents’ Dinner, Obama told a not-so-funny joke about his command of drone strikes as he introduced the Jonas Brothers, a pop band. In mock seriousness, he warned the band members to steer clear of his daughters: “Sasha and Malia are huge fans, but boys, don’t get any ideas. Two words for you: Predator drones. You’ll never see it coming.” **The logic of patriarchal masculine protection in national security is rarely expressed so literally, but the anecdote is faithful to the general narrative** (Young 2003). In brief, **the patriarch** (national leader or state) **assumes protection of the feminized weak** (figurative but not necessarily embodied ¶ women and children at home or abroad) **in the face of a menacing or predatory masculine threat**.¶ However, one person’s masculine predator is another’s masculine protector. Not only is U.S. drone power experienced by many abroad as the menacing predator against ¶ which one needs protection, but this it arguably counterproductive for U.S. national ¶ security. **Becker and Shane attest that drones have become “a provocative symbol of** ¶ **American power**” (Becker and Shane 2012). A prominent example is the U.S. Justice¶ Department White Paper released in 2013, declaring that the president will not be ¶ constrained by national sovereignty, as a drone strike will proceed “with the consent of ¶ the host nation’s government or after a determination that the host nation is unable or ¶ unwilling to suppress the threat” (Department of Justice. n.d.). That is, **drone strikes will** ¶ **proceed with or without the host nation’s consent. Pakistan and Yemen, unable to protect** ¶ **their own borders against penetration by U.S. drones or Al Qaeda, are demasculinized in** ¶ **the process.** Wishing to avoid domestic acknowledgement of its weakened position,¶ **Pakistan secretly gave conditional permission for drone strikes in the FATA region**.¶ **There is a paternalistic expression in rescuing feminized regions of the world**. On the one ¶ hand, the U.S. as masculinist protector expressed through predators and reapers directs¶ U.S. public attention away from civilian terrain bloodied by drone strikes (Shaw & ¶ Akhter 2012, 1502). On the other hand, **demasculinization creates conditions for** ¶ **resentment and resistance abroad**.**The high-tech and relatively accurate armed drones emphasize U.S. toughness to** ¶ **other nations and non-state militaries**. **The U.S. military has assigned unusually bellicose** ¶ **names and imagery to its drones**, most notably Predator and Reaper. The U.S. Navy ¶ Program Executive Office’s emblem for its Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons ¶ program features the Grim Reaper, replete with scythe and glowing red eyes. **Though** ¶ **surveillance is a primary purpose even for drones with strike capability, the logo the** ¶ **drone names emphasizes their lethal capacities.** Such forthright promotion of a weapons ¶ system’s terrorizing qualities is instructive. USAF Chief of Staff General Michael ¶ Moseley explained that, “[‘Reaper’] captures the lethal nature of this new weapon ¶ system… We’ve moved from using UAVs primarily in intelligence, surveillance, and¶ reconnaissance roles before Operation Iraqi Freedom, to a true hunter-killer role” (U.S. ¶ Air Force 2006). The Reaper’s predecessor, the Predator, is similarly menacing, as the ¶ name itself implies that this weapon machine preys on humans.¶ Names given to past U.S. weapon systems range from animals and insects (for ¶ example, the unmenacing Hummingbird and Terrier but also the lethal Scorpion and ¶ Cobra), to weapons of yesteryear (Tomahawk and Dagger), to innocuous names for ¶ weapons of mass destruction (Peacekeeper and Honest John). Not since the WWII-era ¶ aircrafts Avenger and Invader have weapon systems matched this level of bellicosity. ¶ Charles Kauffman (1989, 273) explained, “**The names we give weapons are an index to** ¶ **our perceptions of threats posed by our enemies, the conditions under which we are** ¶ **willing to use violence, and the fearsomeness we attribute to its engines”** (Kauffman ¶ 1989, 277). If the UAV names embody motives, the Predator and Reaper suggest ¶ confidence in the drone weapons ability to kill terrorists, dehumanizing them as preyed ¶ upon or reap-able. There is, I suggest, a sort of “natural order of things” produced ¶ through these names. A predator hunts and kills prey. There is a similar inevitability to ¶ the Grim Reaper’s work. **The baldly lethal names for attack drones also signal**¶ **unambiguously to a domestic political and military audience that these are not “just”** ¶ **surveillance drones, and the military has shifted into hunter-killer mode in UAV function**. ¶ **Military strategists and commentators increasingly call attention to the backlash** ¶ **engendered by drone warfare, that it “allows our opponents to cast our country as a** ¶ **distant, high-tech, amoral purveyor of death. It builds resentment, facilitates terrorist** ¶ **recruitment and alienates those we should seek to inspire”** (Volker 2012). General ¶ Stanley McChrystal allowed that in some regions, drones are “hated on a visceral level” and contribute to a “perception of American arrogance” (Alexander 2013). Journalist ¶ David Rohde, held captive for seven months in 2008 in the tribal areas of Pakistan, ¶ concludes that “drone strikes have become … too much associated with the heavy handed use of American power. … From the ground, drones are terrifying weapons that ¶ can be heard circling overhead for hours at a time. **They are a potent, unnerving symbol of unchecked American power**” (Rohde 2012). For example, after an attack that killed ¶ two local leaders who had been resisting Al Qaeda, infuriated villagers protested:¶ “[S]ome …say there was an upwelling of support for Al Qaeda, because such a move is ¶ seen as the only way to retaliate against the United States” (Worth, Mazzetti, and Shane¶ 2013). **There is an abstract masculine logic then, such that drone warfare can be** ¶ **perceived on the ground as a particularly ruthless expression of predatory masculinity,** ¶ **which in turn can hail and legitimate a protective masculine response.** Idealized masculinity **is often validated and valorized in war in the name of protecting** feminized others **threatened by a predatory masculine** (Spivak 1988; Abu ¶ Lughod 2002; Young 2003). But **drone warfare presents a few wrinkles in this logic, as** ¶ **the U.S. pursuit of war via drones can all-too-readily be represented not as the protector but the predator**. True to its name, within its strike zone abroad, **the Predator drone** (and ¶ other drones with strike capabilities) **projects a** predatory masculinity**, a powerful and abusive masculine that calls forth a** masculine protector. Arguably, **this enhances Al** ¶ **Qaeda’s ability to represent itself as the protector against predatory masculinity** of the ¶ Predators and Reapers and the U.S. administration calling the shots. This helps us better ¶ understand the blowback of drones on the local population, bolstering those arguments that UAVs are counter-productive in that they serve to enhance Al-Qaeda and Taliban ¶ recruitment efforts. UAV strikes are represented as highly precise, and missiles do hit their mark with ¶ impressive accuracy. However, distinguishing by remote between terrorists and civilians, ¶ enemies and innocents, is imprecise, with no resemblance to a court of law. Rather, the ¶ drone crew and video analysts, with little training in the local customs and traditions, ¶ attempt to identify weapons and interpret behavior of those they are tracking, and they¶ often fall back on judgments based upon characteristics such as height and clothing. ¶ **These crude proxies are highly gendered, a point often missed in critical analyses of** ¶ **drone warfare.**¶ **To explore the gendered nature of tracking and targeting baddies, as they are** ¶ **sometimes termed in military parlance, I examine the U.S. attack on February 21, 2010** ¶ **that killed 23 civilians in central Afghanistan**. This was a coordinated effort between the¶ drone crew in Nevada, civilian video analysts or “screeners” in Florida (employees of ¶ military contractor SAIC, Inc.), U.S. Special Forces in a Taliban-controlled area, as well ¶ as an A-10 jet and two Kiowa helicopters. The Los Angeles Times gained release of the ¶ transcript of the drone crew communication through the Freedom of Information Act. ¶ Gregory (2011) insightfully argues the Nevada-based Predator crew’s strong ¶ identification with U.S. troops in Afghanistan is key to understanding this tragedy. He¶ maintains that the drone audio-visual technology “viscerally immerses physically remote operators in combat and reinforces their sense of communion with troops on the ground,”¶ which in turn can lead the drone crew to over-identify with the boots-on-the-ground soldiers in hostile territory such that they overlook or misread evidence (203). ¶ **I suggest that a gendered lens applied to this same transcript yields additional** ¶ **insights, revealing this drone operation relied upon masculinist imperialist dynamics**. ¶ **The logic of protective masculinity**, relying upon a predatory masculine other **for its** ¶ **reason for being, interacts with a masculine imperialist logic in which Afghani woman**¶ **are “an object of protection from her own kind” used to justify the efforts of “**white men ¶ saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1988, 296). What I hope to convey here ¶ is that the **masculine imperialist impulse takes odd twists and turns between predatory** ¶ **and protective masculinity**. Viewing brown women as in need of saving not only says ¶ something about the men from which they are being saved. **Drone crews are typically** ¶ **charged with close observation of the human impact of the violence they unleashed, and** ¶ **this observation “viscerally immerses physically remote operators**” (Gregory 2011, 203) ¶ **not only in combat, but also post-combat carnage**. The gendered, raced, and aged bodies¶ **of those killed and maimed speak back to the crew. I suggest this is a crucial difference** ¶ **in warfare with gendered implication**s—that that unlike other combat pilots, **drone crews** ¶ **perform post-attack surveillance that can call into question the type of masculinity they** ¶ **performed.**

#### It is through these ritualized power hierarchies that the executive glorifies the masculine ideal as neutral and objective justifying violence without care for ethnicity and race through the logic of appropriateness – norms prescribe acceptable behavior that naturalizes violence on the feminine body

Chappell 2006 – Louise is a professor of Social Science at University of Sydney, Comparing Political Institutions: Revealing the Gendered “Logic of Appropriateness,” Politics & Gender, 2 (2006), 221–263. Printed in the U.S.A. <http://journals.cambridge.org.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/download.php?file=%2FPAG%2FPAG2_02%2FS1743923X06001048a.pdf&code=074f4fab253d0a1b417e3dfa463249ff#page=3>

One of the key features of neo-institutionalism is the emphasis on the¶ centrality of norms in influencing the nature of institutions (Thelen and¶ Steinmo 1992; Peters 1999). This perspective is well described in the¶ work of James March and Johan Olsen (1989, 161), who view political¶ institutions as¶ collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations....When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules.¶ When they encounter a new situation, they try to associate it with a situation for which rules already exist. Through rules and a logic of appropriateness, political institutions realize both order, stability and predictability,¶ on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness, on the other.¶ A logic of appropriateness suggests that institutions constrain certain¶ types of behavior while encouraging others. Although this logic is not¶ impermeable, it is difficult to unsettle as it is perpetuated by institutional¶ actors who “embody and reflect existing norms and beliefs” (McAdam¶ and Scott 2005, 15) and who seek to maintain the rules.¶ There has been a plethora of comparative research into the role played¶ by institutional norms in shaping political and policy outcomes in areas¶ that include the economy, health, transport, and welfare, among others¶ (for example, see Davis et al. 2005; Steinmo et al. 1992). However, the¶ mainstream literature has given surprisingly little attention to the gendered underpinnings of many of these norms. What this literature has¶ failed to recognize is that institutional norms prescribe (as well as proscribe) “acceptable” masculine and feminine forms of behavior, rules,¶ and values for men and women within institutions. Moreover, political¶ institutions also produce outcomes—polices, legislation, rulings—that¶ are shaped by gender norms: outcomes which, in turn, help to re/produce¶ broader social and political gender expectations. In other words, what¶ the mainstream institutional literature has failed to do is develop an account of the operation of gender processes (Beckwith 2005, 132–33)¶ within and through political institutions.¶ While mainstream studies of institutions have failed to take gender into¶ account, feminist scholars have been alert to its importance (Acker 1992;¶ Savage and Witz 1992; Stivers 1993). In a review of research on gender¶ and institutions, Joni Lovenduski (1998, 348) points to four areas of knowledge essential to the study of gender and institutions. It is necessary to¶ have an awareness that 1) everyone in an institution has a sex and performs gender; 2) the experience of individuals in institutions varies by¶ both sex and gender; 3) sex and gender interact with other components of¶ identity—for example, race, ethnicity—that also have implications for¶ models of femininity and masculinity; and 4) institutions have distinctively gendered cultures and are involved in processes of producing and¶ reproducing gender. This last point, in particular, links to the importance of uncovering the gendered nature of the logic of appropriateness¶ within institutions across time and place. Space does not permit a thorough treatment of the operation of this logic across a range of political¶ institutions. Nevertheless, a brief exploration of the operation of gender¶ norms in the bureaucratic sphere will help to illustrate the point.¶ In many Western liberal states, but especially those with Westminster¶ parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,¶ and New Zealand, the bureaucracy has developed, over time, a strong¶ underlying commitment to the norm of bureaucratic neutrality. As it is¶ applied in Westminster systems, neutrality creates a set of “rules” for public servants that stipulates what they may and may not do. Public servants understand that they may not engage in partisan political activities¶ or express their personal views on government policies or administration. It is made equally clear that their principal duty is to execute policy¶ decisions loyally and impartially, irrespective of the party in power and¶ regardless of their personal opinions (Kernaghan 1985).¶ Though largely unrecognized by nonfeminist scholars, the norm of neutrality is profoundly gendered. It suggests that “administrators can rise above their own beliefs and the political fray to fix their sights on the public interest, broadly conceived” (Stivers 1993, 38) and that there is a¶ set of universal norms that can be used as a reliable prism through which¶ to view the world. The emphasis on the importance of individuals being¶ able to detach themselves from situations and act with “dispassionate¶ objectivity” reflects an emphasis on traditional masculine traits (Stivers¶ 1993, 40). Meanwhile, values such as emotion, sensibility, or passion, in¶ other words those that have been identified as “feminine” values, are¶ regarded as excessive and laden with bias (Stivers 1993, 41).¶ Understanding the gender foundations of this norm is important for¶ anyone interested in the operations of state bureaucracies. It demonstrates that despite their neutral appearance, embedded assumptions about¶ appropriate forms of behavior in the public service are, in fact, masculine. Understanding the operation of gender through norms such as neutrality is also helpful for social movement actors, especially feminist¶ activists who seek to use state institutions—including the bureaucracy—¶ to advance their equality claims. The gender assumptions underlying¶ bureaucratic neutrality would suggest that the stronger the enforcement of these norms, the less chance there is for feminists to work from¶ within or without the bureaucracy to advance what could only be considered under these conditions as a “biased” policy position of gender¶ equality. Comparative institutional research across three Westminster style bureaucracies—in Australia, Canada, and the UK—bears out this¶ assumption.¶ Historically, the norm of neutrality has always been in operation within¶ the Australian public sector, but it has been weakened by a tolerance for¶ advocates of sectional interests to work within the bureaucracy to advance their aims. Throughout the twentieth century, internal advocacy¶ was especially prominent among producer and industry groups, including trade unions, manufacturers, and farmers, who encouraged government to establish public sector bodies—described as “organs of syndical¶ satisfaction” (Miller 1964, 65)—and staff them with members of the “outsider” groups who could then push their policy agenda from within. Australian feminists were profoundly influenced by the tradition of sectional¶ interests looking toward the administrative arm of the state, and the state¶ responding by providing them with institutional structures through which¶ they could advance their claims. Most importantly, it encouraged feminists to look to this arena to have their demands met. Feminists, especially in the period 1975–95, successfully agitated for state and federal¶ governments to create women’s policy agencies in which they could work as “femocrats”: senior women’s policy officers whose feminism was a criterion for the job. Once “inside,” femocrats were able to develop policies to address women’s inequality in areas that include the budget, child¶ care, pensions, superannuation, and violence against women (see Chappell 2002a; Eisenstein 1996; Sawer 1990). By contrast, in both Canada and the United Kingdom, feminists wanting to engage with the civil service have been confronted with the operation of stronger neutrality norms. Compared to Canberra, Ottawa and¶ Whitehall have remained wedded to notions of anonymity and nonpartisan neutrality. The continuing potency of neutrality has represented a¶ major obstacle to a “femocrat project” in both countries. The prejudice¶ against internal “feminist agitators” in Ottawa has been noted by former¶ Canadian feminist bureaucrats. They talk of initiatives being stonewalled¶ and trivialized, treated with indifference and impatience by senior managers, or met with a “wilful misunderstanding” (Findlay 1987). According to Linda Geller-Schwartz, in Canada, “the idea that civil servants¶ should adopt the role of internal lobbyists for women as a definable group¶ was an anathema” (1995, 49). Similarly in the UK, the ongoing strength¶ of neutrality has made it difficult for feminists to operate within the bureaucracy for fear that they were “biased.” For those who do, it is difficult¶ to form networks with external feminist groups. According to staff in the¶ UK Women’s Unit, women committed to feminist principles working in¶ the unit tend to keep their views to themselves. Moreover, any sign of¶ advocacy on behalf of “women” has not been welcome (Chappell 2002b).¶ Bureaucratic neutrality is but one gendered institutional norm that¶ shapes the logic of appropriateness for actors engaging with and through¶ the bureaucracy. Other norms within Westminster-style bureaucracies,¶ such as merit and career service, also operate along masculinist lines.¶ The meritorious ideal public servant is a rational, detached, calculating¶ individual, while the desired attributes for appointment to the career service include a full-time unbroken work record, as well as the assumption¶ of full-time domestic support (Burton 1991, 3). The assumptions underpinning both concepts are highly gendered. While women are considered less deserving of promotion because of their purported irrational¶ nature, their historic absence at senior levels of the bureaucracy has had¶ a further gendering effect: Without women’s input, policy decisions that¶ are made at the highest level have tended to disregard (and thereby reinforce) the unequal political, economic, and social position of the two¶ sexes, as well as make stereotypical assumptions about male and female¶ behavior (on this point, also see Acker 1992, 567).

#### Notions of naturalness and appropriateness cuts across both race and gender – racialized violence is made possible by the same logic that makes feminine bodies disposable and justifies the US war on the nonwhite body

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Historically critical reflection on whiteness in the United States has been a long-standing practice in slave folklore and in Mexican resistance to colonialism, Asian American struggles against exploitation and containment, and Native American stories of contact with European colonizers. Drawing from this legacy and from the disturbing silence on "whiteness" in postsecondary institutions, critical whiteness scholarship has emerged in the past two decades in U.S. academies in a variety of disciplines. A small number of philosophers, critical race theorists, postcolonial theorists, social historians, and cultural studies scholars have revisited and reexamined questions of race and identity with an analysis that now focuses on historical studies of racial formation and the deconstruction of whiteness as an unmarked privilege-granting category and system of dominance. Collectively, these writings identify whiteness as a cultural disposition and ideology held in place by specific political, social, moral, aesthetic, epistemic, metaphysical, economic, legal, and historical conditions, crafted to preserve white identity and relations of white supremacy (Mills 2003). In this way**,** whiteness studies is a conscious attempt to think critically about how white supremacy continues to operate systemically, and sometimes unconsciously, as a global colonizing force.¶ Philosophical methods are well suited for unpacking the conditions that hold whiteness in place, so why has the discipline remained relatively untouched by these conversations? One answer lies in the whiteness of philosophy itself. The absence of color talk in philosophy is a marker of the discipline's whiteness. As George Yancy notes: "A key feature of the social ontology of whiteness is that whites attempt to avoid discussing their own social, political, economic, and cultural investments in whiteness" (2004, 4). Academic philosophy in the United States has been largely driven by the legacy of Classic Greek and [End Page vii] European thinkers. Philosophy departments are white social spaces and the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers in the United States are white men. It's likely that white philosophers have simply avoided racial topics because many believe that philosophical thought transcends those basic cultural, racial, and ethnic differences, and that these issues are more appropriately addressed by other humanities scholars or by social scientists. Conventional philosophical inquiry and method is thought to be color-blind and universally humanistic. White ways of knowing, seeing, ontologizing, evaluating, being, nation building, and judging have been presented to us as ways of doing philosophy pure and simple. As Arnold Farr observes, philosophy holds that "there is no white perspective but only the universal, impartial, disinterested view from nowhere. . . . Whiteness becomes visible in the very absence of a serious consideration of the problem of race in philosophy" (2004, 1540). The fact that white folks can only see whiteness and its attendant privileges with some difficulty may partially explain why we tend to position our white racialized experience as human experience.¶ We don't mean to suggest that philosophers have avoided questions of race altogether. The handful of conversations mirror and intersect with the dialogues feminists started on gender and class more than thirty years ago when we set out to demonstrate both the maleness of philosophy, and the usefulness of philosophy as a tool for discussing gender inequalities. Groundbreaking collections, such as Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga's This Bridge Called My Back (1983), Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith's Allthe Women Are White, All the Men Are Black, But Some of Us Are Brave (1982), Audre Lorde's works, along with endless difficult conversations with women of color, pushed white feminists philosophers to explore the intersections of race and gender. A decade later, some feminist theorists and philosophers turned their attention to interrogating white privilege and white supremacy. A few feminist works serve as milestones in the philosophical project of understanding whiteness (Alcoff 2000, 2006; Bailey 1998; Cuomo 1999; Davion 1995; Frye 1983, 1992; Harding 1991; Lugones 1991, 2003; Spelman 1988; Stubblefield 2005; Tessman and Bar-On 1999; Thompson 2001; Wiegman 1999; Zack 1993).¶ There exists a parallel development by philosophers of race who have set out to demonstrate the whiteness of philosophy (Mills 1997, 1998, 2003, 2004; Yancy 2004). One facet of this project has been to tease out white supremacy as a consciously constructed system. As Charles Mills observes: "Just as Marx moved back and forth between the empirical and the philosophical for his analysis of capitalism, and just as feminists have moved back and forth between the theoretical and empirical in our analyses of patriarchy, so might philosophical work on race and white supremacy proceed" (2004, 32). Drawing inspiration from the work of black intellectuals such as W. E. B DuBois, Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin, and Franz Fanon, these new philosophers have argued for the [End Page viii]importance of making race visible in philosophical inquiry. Although these projects have been largely inattentive to gender, they have nonetheless done groundbreaking work to reveal the connections and tensions between the history of Western philosophy and colonial projects.¶ While some academic philosophers are certainly paying more attention to white supremacy and its accompanying logics, less attention has been paid to the ways gendered bodies have been, and continue to be, disciplined and regulated in racialized ways that reinforce the dominant (white) racial order. The aim of this special issue is to further our understandings of how the historical and material conditions aimed at culturally and biologically reproducing whiteness are advanced through the regulation of gendered bodies. When we first conceived of this volume we saw it as a way to make questions of white supremacy more visible in feminist work in philosophy. We wanted to encourage philosophers to identify the ways white supremacy and patriarchy continue to cooperate through the disciplining of gendered bodies, and how particular groups resist disciplining. To open up this dialogue, we sent out a call for papers that gave us a very small yield of submissions using conventional philosophical analysis. A second call brought in a richly complex set of writings that bears philosophical as well as interdisciplinary weight. Disappointed by the absence of current feminist philosophical work on engendering whiteness studies, we proceeded with the new assumption that our disciplinary matrix of conventional philosophy may be too narrow to address the question of whiteness at the heart of reproductive practices. History and specificity become utterly important in this endeavor. In this sense, the volume recognizes the necessity of interdisciplinarity to doing what Anna Stubblefield has called "postsupremacist philosophy" (2005).¶ We extended the notion of 'reproduction' to include practices of reading and cultural forms of reiteration, but shied away from making the special issue into a philosophically driven cultural studies volume. Our volume is interdisciplinary by necessity: it offers theoretical and philosophical perspectives grounded in a variety of disciplinary starting points, all of which illustrate how whiteness remains at the center of reproduction and social regulation. Our hope is that this volume will further open philosophical conversations on the ways white supremacy regulates gender by providing new ways of thinking through those histories and reproductive materialities that make whiteness simultaneously a centrally defining signifier of bodies, values, and meanings and a signifier coding the "normal," "the pure" and "the real" in white supremacist thinking.

#### The debate over the effectiveness of US targeted killing operates within a technological frame that preemptively strikes individuals based off of profiling; reducing the killing thousands to blips on a computer screen and rendering invisible the psychological damage experienced by those forced to live in constant fear of American “protection.”

Shaw ‘13 (Ian G. R. Shaw, Professor of Human Geography at the University of Glasgow, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare”, Geopolitics, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2012, 2013)

The Double Tap

The debate over whether or not drone strikes are a “success” is usually focused on their ability to target and eliminate “militants”. This technological enframing fails to consider what everyday life is like for the broader populations that live under the drones53**.** Two recent publications are noteworthy in this respect: a 2010 report headed by Christopher Rogers of CIVIC54, which interviewed over 160 Pakistani Civilians suffering direct losses from the U.S. strikes, and an extensive 2012 report released by The Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic at the New York University School of Law 55, which interviewed 130 people, including victims, witnesses, and other experts. Both reports provide firsthand testimony by those civilian populations living on the fleshy side of the disposition matrix. Stanford and NYU’s report has four main findings. First, civilians are routinely killed, often in so-called “double tap” strikes that kill anyone that tends to the dead and wounded in the wake of an attack. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism claims that at least 50 civilians and “first responders” had been killed after they rushed to help victims of drone strikes56. One interviewee, Hayatullah Ayoub Khan, recounted a particularly harrowing experience57. A drone missile was fired at a car around 300 meters in front of him while driving. Hayatullah exited his vehicle and slowly approached the wreckage, cautious that he might be a victim of a follow-up strike. He walked close enough to the car to see a flailing arm inside. The injured occupant “yelled that he should leave immediately because another missile would likely strike”. Hayatullah did as instructed, returning to his car just as a second missile struck the survivor. The second finding from Stanford and NYU is that beyond direct physical and monetary damage, the constant hovering of drones has lead to a deeply entrenched psychological malaise amongst ci vilians. Many community members now shy away from social gatherings, including important tribal meetings and funerals, with some parents even electing to keep their children away from school. Third, there is scant evidence that the strikes have made the U.S. “safer”. The “evidence suggests that US strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivated further violent attacks”58. Finally, the CIA’s program of targeted killings undermines respect for, and adherence to, international law and sets a dangerous precedent. The death of innocent people is a common theme among interviewees in both reports. CIVIC interviewed Guy Nawaz, a resident of North Waziristan who was watering his fields when he heard the screech and boom of a Hellfire: “I rushed to my house when I heard the blast. When I arrived I saw my house and my brother’s house completely destroyed and all at home were dead”59. Eleven of his family were killed, including his wife, two sons and two daughters, as well as his older brother, his wife and four children. He continued, “We were living a happy life and I didn’t have any links with the Taliban. My family members were innocent... I wonder, why was I victimized?”60 Safia lost her 30 year-old husband and 7 year-old son when a militant vehicle was struck by a drone as it passed her house. She said that “I hope the Taliban are all killed. But I hope the drone attacks are stopped immediately. They are not effective against the Taliban hideouts. USA and Pakistan should realize the fact that for the last 5-6 years the drone attacks have been taking place but no Taliban has left extremism or terrorism”61. Stories of emotional and psychological trauma were frequently recounted in both reports, with medical professionals diagnosing the “anticipatory anxiety” and “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (PTSD) many civilians now suffer with. As Safdar Dawar, President of the Tribal Union of Journalists explains 62: If I am walking in the market, I have this fear that maybe the person walking next to me is going to be a target of the drone. If I’m shopping, I’m really careful and scared. If I’m standing on the road and there is a car parked next to me, I never know if that is going to be the target. Maybe they will target the car in front of me or behind me. Even in mosques, if we’re praying, we’re worried that maybe one person who is standing with us praying is wanted. So, wherever we are, we have this fear of drones. Both reports are an important challenge to the legitimization of drone warfare, especially in light of recent figures by a Washington Post-ABC News poll that found 83 percent of those Americans surveyed “approve” of the use of drones against suspected terrorists overseas63. The near-impossibility of travel to FATA by journalists and researchers outside or inside of Pakistan means that these reports give a rare glimpse of life on the ground. These shared stories of the women, children, and men of FATA “disturbs and disrupts the hegemonic foreign policy gaze”64, and refocuses the lens of the White House’s geographical imagination. Drone warfare in Pakistan, just like the “war on terror” more generally, is not a universal experience65: it is differentially distributed and violently uneven, split between suburban pilots that sit in air-conditioned trailers and scan video screens, adjusting their “soda straw” digital view of the world with a joystick, and the everyday experiences told by the people of FATA. While not wanting to overstate the case, these stories are important for rehumanising the abstract discourses of security strategy and the bureaucratic spaces of the disposition matrix. The Predator Empire The Biopolitics of the Predator Empire In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire. Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the CIA’s drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests a diffuse (if by no means singular) drift towards the dronification of national security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities67. This means that the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense 68. The agency’s 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”69. But who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an affiliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “The history of security is a history of the changing problematisation of what it is to be a political subject and politically subject”70, then the discursive baptism of the affiliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further complicated because affiliate are not always identifiable individuals such as an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the remainder of this section, affiliates can be threatening patterns of life that are coded, catalogued, and eliminated. As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings71. Analysts and ‘targeters’ located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a team of lawyers before it signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the first time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”73. The devil here is in the detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on one of the CIA’s classified kill lists or the disposition matrix, a signature is constructed from observing and cataloguing a pattern of life—coding the behavior and geography of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld. This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan. Between 2004 and 2007 there were 10 drone attacks, but between the pivot year of 2008 and 2012, this figure leapt to 333 74. In Table 1, I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan. To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the fighters: “The very next day our house was hit... My only son Khaliq was killed. I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son had unwittingly become “affiliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably place on March 17, 2011. The CIA fired at least two missiles into a large gathering—a jirga led by a decorated public servant—near a bus depot in the town of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The U.S. insists that all were militants. And yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed were civilians 75. Of the four suspected Taliban militants identified by the Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identified by name. As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “Independent information about who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce”76. Other officials in the U.S. State Department have complained that the classified criteria used by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist training camp”77. Table 1 about here Table 2 about here Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists, performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract space”78, but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life. While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics79, it was a term first coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France80, a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge” in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being the critical historian of population”81. In classical theories of sovereignty, the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live’ 82, and its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”83. This sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and let die”84 in the nineteenth-century. This transformation involved a shift from disciplinary technologies that targeted “man-as-body” (what Foucault calls an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “man-as-species” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the aim is was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”86. All of might be termed “State control of the biological”87. Dillon and Reid88 extend Foucault’s biopolitics of the population to a biopolitics of the molecular. They argue that as the life sciences changed over the last century, so too did the “bios” of biopolitics, becoming ever more processual, spontaneous, and based on codes (such as DNA). This “recombinant biopolitics” fed directly into the visions of Rumsfeld’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” to create a new organizing principle “concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the profiling of individuals within the population”89. Under this new metaphysics of power, in which “power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish profiles, patterns and probabilities” 90, information is a weapon and securing territory is no longer viewed with the same importance as securing patterns of life. For Foucault, this means that dangerousness, what is to be secured, is no longer an actualized danger, but is located within behavioral potentialities. Or as Bruce Braun suggests, “Today, security’s principal answer to the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’ is the speculative act of pre-emption, which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks”91. Consequently, dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous. In the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, most people killed by U.S. drones have not been al-Qa’ida fighters. In fact, the number of al-Qa’ida militants eliminated has been just 8% under the Obama administration92. This means that a far greater number of people who played no part in the attacks of September 11, 2001 have been vaporized by Hellfire missiles. Former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, went so far as to question whether “killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001”93. The presumptive “guilt” of many of those killed in Pakistan today is thus constructed around the so-called “immanent” threat they pose to the U.S. Homeland: a pre-emptive, future-oriented biopolitics that exists in an exceptional space outside of centuries of international humanitarian law. These Pakistani “affiliates”—which include the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network members, are part of a much wider expansion of who count as affiliates in a globalizing drone war. The very condition that makes a biopolitics possible in the first place then—life—has become a force to be coded and secured. As Dillon describes it, “The biopolitics of security today is precisely this political emergency of emergence instituting a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the infinite number of ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life rather than some existential friend/enemy distinction”94. The appearance of the affiliate in the NSS and NSC marks the emergence of a far more process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger, where the “threat” is located in what individuals could become in the future, and security is defined as anticipating and eliminating the emergence of such danger. For Dillon, this erasure of the concept of “man” by targeting “life” means that “it is no longer adequate to judge lifelike bodies in terms of the essence of that existential otherness definite of the enemy alone, for every-body is a continuously emergent body-in-formation comprised of contingently adaptive rather than fixed properties”95. The “evental”96 nature of this “emergent emergency” helps explains the conditions surrounding the CIA’s shift in targeting practices from personality strikes to signature strikes and the changing object of national security from al-Qa’ida the organization to al-Qa’ida affiliates. In both cases the targets for the Predator Empire are not simply actualized forms of danger, but virtualized forms of emergence that may become threats in the future97. The Spatial Topology of the Predator Empire According to research by Nick Turse, the U.S. military operates 1,100 bases across the planet98. Many of these sites exist in shadow because they are used for paramilitary operations by Special Forces and the CIA. These bases range in size and location, but a recent and favored strategy of the U.S. military has been to construct skeletal “lily pads” that are scattered in remote outposts across the globe. Chalmers Johnson, author of the book Blowback, wrote back in 2004 that “[t]his vast network of American bases on every continent except Antarctica actually constitutes a new form of empire – an empire of bases with its own geography not likely to be taught in any high school geography class”99. While this “new form of empire” has been growing for decades, the proliferation of remotely piloted aircraft certainly marks a new phase in its evolution—the Predator Empire. Everywhere and nowhere, drones have become sovereign tools of life and death, where with “the lives and deaths of subjects become rights only as a result of the will of the sovereign”100. The Predator Empire is underpinned by an expanding geography of drone bases in and around the “areas of concern” mentioned in the NSS and NSC. There are now at least 60 bases used for U.S. military and CIA drones—from medium sized Predators and Reapers to experimental systems such as the “Sentinel” that was captured by Iran. As part of their surveillance of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Mali, U.S. drones have flown out of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, the Seychelles, Niger, and many more 101. These geographic locations are intended to develop overlapping circles of surveillance. The jewel in the crown in this new form of empire is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which is sandwiched between Somalia and Yemen. This secretive 500-acre base is the first ever camp dedicated solely to tracking and eliminating al-Qa’ida and its “affiliates”102. Around 16 drones either take off or land every day at the base, which has its origins as an outpost in the French Foreign Legion. Activities at Camp Lemonnier increased in 2010 after 8 Predators were delivered, turning the camp into a fully-fledged drone base. The CIA first shipped its Predators to the camp in 2002 103, and it now acts in collaboration with the secretive Joint Special Operations Command. A total of 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians, and contractors are assigned to the camp where they “train foreign militaries, gather intelligence and dole out humanitarian aid across East Africa as part of a campaign to prevent extremists from taking root”104. In short, Camp Lemonnier is the concrete symbol of a Predator Empire no longer bound to Pakistan or Afghanistan, and expanding across the Africa. But despite this concrete presence, the CIA’s fleet of secret drones has little interest in securing “territory” in the traditional sense, seeking instead to secure and eliminate patterns of life that threaten. In Security, Territory, Population105 Foucault details how biopower is not exercised across territory per se 106, but through spaces of circulation or a “milieu” of human and nonhuman multiplicities that constitute life-in-the-making. Similarly he wrote that the last domain of biopolitics is “control over relations between the human race, or human beings insofar as they are a species, insofar as they are living beings, and their environment, the milieu in which they live”107. Here, Foucault refers to both natural and manmade environments, where mastery of the environment is translated into mastery of the population. Sloterdijk goes so far as to state that “The 20th century will be remembered as the period whose decisive idea consisted in targeting not the body of the enemy, but his environment”108. Indeed, securing the atmosphere has continually transformed understandings of space, power, and sovereignty 109. The question is therefore how is the environment a biopolitical target for the Predator Empire? How is the environment understood and controlled? Unlike forms of environmental intervention that leave a gigantic “footprint” in the soil of the earth, such as the counterinsurgency pursued in Iraq, the Predator Empire pursues a different kind of spatial biopolitics; a virtual intervention where what is captured is not “hearts and minds” but endless streams of information that are broadcast back to the Homeland. This suggests that the direction of power is not just an outward projection—as with the geographic expansionism that traditionally defines “American power projection” across the globe. Rather, it also suggests an inward power collection: defined here as the power to incorporate, to bring closer. The drone continues to transform U.S. biopower by bringing distant “areas of concern” such as the tribal areas of Pakistan into the gaze of pilots, targeters, and analysts in Creetch Air Force Base in Nevada. This power to make the faraway intimate is “a non-symmetrical power topology which sometimes coincides with a geographically materialized power topology and sometimes does not”110. Predators “fold” space with an unparalleled level of aeromobility, reducing the importance that geographic distance and obstacles have in separating “there” from “here”. This power topology is not strictly exercised across space then, but rather, it is the capacity to crumple an environment by digitizing it. As Allen states, “The use of real-time technologies to create a simultaneous presence in a diversity of settings is, for instance, just one way in which relations of presence and absence may be reconfigured so that the gap between ‘here and there’ is bridged relationally, and distance itself is no longer understood simply as a metric”111. The 2012 DSG makes it clear that physical boots on the ground are not part of the strategic environment of the future. The Predator Empire therefore marks the continuing evolution from a reliance on a topographic, ground-intensive empire to a topological, aerial empire. Airpower and aeromobilities has always been a central tenet of U.S. military strategy of course. As Adey summarizes, “From the air raids of the Blitz to the newest unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, aeromobilities provide both promise and possibility, as well as dread, terror, destruction and death’112. And while it is undeniable that the CIA’s ghost war requires an expanding network of drone bases, such a Droneworld is not the end point of power—it is the architecture for the coding, cataloging, and eliminating of life in “real time”, on a scale that is historically unprecedented. It is within the unique topological spatiality of the Predator Empire that targeting killings become ever more decentralized across the planet, even as the power to take life is centralized in the hands of the executive branch of government. When Obama stated that “We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense” in his inaugural address, he appealed to a biopolitics that is the hallmark of our geopolitical condition. The distinctiveness and coherence of “friend” and “enemy” has seemingly melted away into more amorphous patterns of life that are located across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Although Foucault goes to create lengths detailing how biological life is included in politics, and how technologies exist “to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass”113, he also asks how ‘is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill...? 114 He answers quite specifically with racism as “the precondition for exercising the right to kill”115. Certainly, the Pashtun residents in the tribal areas of Pakistan are caught in a net of violent colonial language116 and laws117 inherited from the British Raj. But such violence must constantly be performed and is thus reliant on the technologies and spatialities of state power 118. The civilians living and dying in Pakistan, whose families and friends were interviewed in the 2010 CIVIC report and the 2012 Stanford and New York University report, are exposed to an unaccountable surveillance apparatus that scrutinizes their patterns of life from thousands of miles away. Their vulnerability is inseparable from the topological spatial power of the Predator Empire.

#### The affirmative is a personal refusal of the legitimacy of executive war power authority over targeted killing. Our advocacy starts from a rejection of presidential rhetoric that props ups a norm of white masculinity and strives towards the construction of alternative narratives that disrupt the ritualized replication of violence on disposable bodies.

#### We must refuse the temptation to surrender the debate over who the government kills in our name. Only defending the call from targeted killing survivors to be recognized within a democratic structure that seeks to silence their capacity to speak can we begin to transform politics.

Kelly 2012 - Kathy, co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, Drone-Strike Survivors Ask, "What Kind of Democracy Is America?", http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/6987:dronestrike-survivors-ask-what-kind-of-democracy-is-america

Fazillah, age 25, lives in Maidan Shar, the central city of Afghanistan’s Wardak province. She married about six years ago, and gave birth to a son, Aymal, who just turned five without a father. Fazillah tells her son, Aymal, that his father was killed by an American bomber plane, remote-controlled by computer. That July, in 2007, Aymal’s father was sitting in a garden with four other men. A weaponized drone, what we used to call an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or UAV, was flying, unseen, overhead, and fired missiles into the garden, killing all five men. Now Fazillah and Aymal share a small dwelling with the deceased man’s mother. According to the tradition, a husband’s relatives are responsible to look after a widow with no breadwinner remaining in her immediate family. She and her son have no regular source of bread or income, but Fazillah says that her small family is better off than it might have been: one of the men killed alongside her husband left behind a wife and child but no other living relatives that could provide them with any source of support, at all. Aymal’s grandmother becomes agitated and distraught speaking about her son’s death, and that of his four friends. “All of us ask, ‘Why?’” she says, raising her voice. “They kill people with computers and they can’t tell us why. When we ask why this happened, they say they had doubts, they had suspicions. But they didn’t take time to ask ‘Who is this person?’ or ‘Who was that person?’ There is no proof, no accountability. Now, there is no reliable person in the home to bring us bread. I am old, and I do not have a peaceful life.” Listening to them, I recall an earlier conversation I had with a Pakistani social worker and with Safdar Dawar, a journalist, both of whom had survived drone attacks in the area of Miran Shah, in Pakistan’s Waziristan province. Exasperated at the increasingly common experience which they had survived and which too many others have not, they began firing questions at us. “Who has given the license to kill and in what court? Who has declared that they can hit anyone they like?” “How many ‘high level targets’ could there possibly be?” “What kind of democracy is America,” Safdar asks, “where people do not ask these questions?” One question Fazillah cannot answer for her son is whether anyone asked the question at all of whether to kill his father. Forbes Magazine reports that the Air Force has sixty-five to seventy thousand analysts processing drone video surveillance; a Rand review states they actually need half again that number to properly handle the data. Asked to point to the human who actually made the decision to kill her husband, she can only point to another machine. In June 2010, Philip G. Alston, then the UN’s Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, appeared before the UN Human Rights Council and testified that “targeted killings pose a rapidly growing challenge to the international rule of law … In a situation in which there is no disclosure of who has been killed, for what reason, and whether innocent civilians have died, the legal principle of international accountability is, by definition, comprehensively violated.” “Such an expanded and open-ended interpretation of the right to self defense comes close to destroying the prohibition on the use of armed force contained in the United Nations Charter. If invoked by other states in pursuit of those they deemed to be terrorists and to have attacked them, it would cause chaos.” This past week, on February 23, the legal action charity” Reprieve” spoke up on behalf of more than a dozen Pakistani families who had lost loved ones in drone strikes, and asked the UN Human Rights Council to condemn the attacks as illegal human rights violations. “In Pakistan, the CIA is creating desolation and calling it peace,” said Reprieve’s Director Clive Stafford Smith. “The illegal programme of drone strikes has murdered hundreds of civilians in Pakistan. The UN must put a stop to it before any more children are killed. Not only is it causing untold suffering to the people of North West Pakistan – it is also the most effective recruiting sergeant yet for the very ‘militants’ the US claims to be targeting.” The lawyer representing the families, Shahzad Akbar of Pakistan’s “Foundation for Fundamental Rights”, said: “If President Obama really believes the drone strikes have ‘pinpoint’ accuracy, it has to be asked where the deaths of kids like Maezol Khan’s eight-year-old son fit into the CIA’s plan. If the US is not prepared to face up to the reality of the suffering the strikes are causing, then the UN must step in. The international community can no longer afford to ignore the human rights catastrophe which is taking place in North West Pakistan in the name of the ‘War on Terror’.” Drone warfare, ever more widely used from month to month from the Bush through the Obama administrations, has seen very little meaningful public debate. We don’t ask questions – our minds straying no nearer these battlefields than in the coming decades the bodies of our young people will – that is, if the chaos our war making engenders doesn’t bring the battlefields to us. An expanding network of devastatingly lethal covert actions spreading throughout the developing world passes with minimal concern or comment. So who does Fazillah blame? Who does one blame when confronted with the actions of a machine? Our Pakistani friend asks, “What kind of a democracy is America where people do not ask these questions?” Becoming an actual democracy, with an actual choice at election-time between war and peace rather than between political machines vying for the chance to bring us war, seems to many Americans, if some of the less-reported polls are to be believed, a near-unachievable goal. The U.S. has become a process that churns out war – today Afghanistan and (in any real sense) Iraq; tomorrow Iran and Pakistan, with China securely, however distantly, on the horizon - and for those of us with any concern for peace, a principled opposition to war ultimately requires a determination to make the U.S. at long last into a democracy, striving as Dr. King enjoined us, in “molding a recalcitrant status quo with bruised hands until we have fashioned it into a brotherhood.” It must begin with compassion - powerless compassion perhaps, perhaps only the ghost of dissent, but compassion for people like Fazillah and Aymal, - and with deciding to be human, maybe only the ghost of a human, but alive in some way and alive to what our assent, and perhaps especially our silence are accomplishing in the world. Humanity is the first thing to be won back - and then, if we have the strength, relentlessly defended - against indifference, complacency, and, above all, inaction. If enough of us refuse to be machines, if enough of us refuse enough, can democracy, and even peace, not be at last achieved? But first comes the refusal. Fazillah wants a peaceful life. She doesn’t want to see any more people killed, any more ghosts like that of her husband. Any more bodies, burned (as she recalls) so charred that they are almost unrecognizable one from another. “I don’t want this to happen to anyone,” says Fazillah. I don’t want any children to be left without parents.”

#### **Our discussion is necessary to expose and criticize structural problems that preclude external restrictions on the executive. Challenging the apathy which allows violent policies to continue provides the impetus for change.**

Druck 2012 - Judah A., B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; Notes Editor, DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand, the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit,124 as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that, we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens sharing in its importance.”125 As a result, the American public has slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy.126 In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to public opinion.127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez, where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because the mission was perceived to be a success.128 Yet we can imagine that most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success,129 we can expect even less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime. Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues.130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces.131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces, which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have generally complied with domestic law.132 The result is that as wars become more limited,133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134 RS RESOLUTION IN THE ERA OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad.135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be concerned about the American public’s increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes. First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially.136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When machines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm. But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense “wake up the populace” in order to check potentially unconstitutional action.137 Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny? The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable.138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place.139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation.140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground.141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare.142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact.143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones.144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare.146 Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian concerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place “enormous trust in our leaders” despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy.147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad.148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs.149